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Class Action Defense Cases–Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners: Fifth Circuit Court Affirms Dismissal Of Class Action Complaint Under Commodities Exchange Act Holding Plaintiffs Failed To Adequately Allege Specific Intent

Jul 13, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

As Matter of First Impression in Circuit, Class Action Claims under CEA (Commodities Exchange Act) Required Allegation of Specific Intent to Manipulate Natural Gas Prices at a Specific Location/for a Specific NYMEX Contract, so District Court Properly Dismissed Class Action Complaint Fifth Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Energy Transfer Partners and its affiliates alleging that they manipulated the price of natural gas futures and options in violation of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA). Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2510122, *1 (5th Cir. June 23, 2010). According to the allegations underlying the class action complaint, plaintiffs bought and sold natural gas futures and options on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and sought “to represent a class of natural gas futures and options contracts traders.” _Id._ The class action alleged that defendants “manipulate[ed] the price of natural gas delivered at the Houston Ship Channel (‘HSC’) and alleged economic harm to [plaintiffs’] NYMEX natural gas futures contracts caused by that manipulation.” _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the ground that the CEA required plaintiffs to allege that defendants specifically intended to manipulate NYMEX natural gas futures contracts; the district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. _Id._, at *1, *4. Plaintiffs appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

We do not here summarize the natural gas futures market. See Hershey, at *1-*2. The issue presented, as a matter of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, was whether defendants were correct in arguing that in order to assert a claim under the CEA plaintiffs were required “to allege that Defendants specifically intended to manipulate the price of natural gas” at a specific location (the Henry Hub) thereby satisfying the requirement under the CEA “that the manipulation be specifically directed toward the underlying commodity of the contract.” Id., at *4. And the district court was considering this defense against a backdrop of regulatory action in that defendants previously had paid $10 million to the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and $30 million to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to settle claims that defendants “created and then exploited price differences between the HSC and the Henry Hub, a major confluence of natural gas pipelines and the settlement price for all NYMEX natural gas futures contracts.” Id., *1, *3. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ class action complaint “substantially mirror[ed] the allegations in regulatory actions against Defendants by the CFTC and FERC.” Id., at *3.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

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iPhone Class Action Defense Cases–Apple and AT&T Mobility Antitrust Litigation: California Federal Court Certifies Nationwide Class Action Against Apple And AT&T On iPhone Antitrust Claims

Jul 12, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Class Action Complaint Against Apple and AT&T for Antitrust Violations in Connection with Sale and Marketing of iPhone Warranted Class Action Treatment California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative nationwide class action against Apple and AT&T Mobility (ATTM) alleging federal antitrust violations; specifically, the class action complaint alleged “monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq., and violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.” In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., ___ F.Supp.3d ___ (N.D.Cal. July 8, 2010) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The district court summarized the allegations underlying the class action complaint at page 1 as follows: “Plaintiffs allege that although they were required to purchase a two-year service agreement with ATTM when they purchased their iPhones, Apple and ATTM had secretly agreed to technologically restrict voice and data service in the aftermarket for continued voice and data services for five years, _i.e._, after Plaintiffs’ initial two-year service period expired. Plaintiffs also allege that Apple monopolized the aftermarket for third party software applications for the iPhone, and that Apple caused the iPhone to become unusable if it detected that a customer had “unlocked” their iPhone for use with other service providers.” Defense attorneys for Apple moved for summary judgment with respect to the class action’s iPhone Operating System Version 1.1.1 claims, which the district court granted. _Id._, at 2. We do not here discuss that portion of the court order. Rather, as part of the same order, the district court considered plaintiffs’ motion to certify the litigation as a class action; the district court granted class action treatment to the lawsuit. _Id._ It is the class action certification portion of the decision that we discuss below.

Plaintiff’s class action certification motion sought to certify the litigation on behalf of a nationwide class defined as follows: “All persons who purchased or acquired an iPhone in the United States and entered into a two-year agreement with Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC for iPhone voice and data service any time from June 29, 2007, to the present.” In re Apple, at 12-13. (The motion additionally sought certification of a sub-class defined as “All iPhone customers whose iPhones were ‘bricked’ by [Apple] at any time during the Class Period.” Id., at 13. However, the district court granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment on the “bricking” claim, so the court did not address the sub-class. Id.) The federal court noted that with respect to Rule 23(a)’s requirements for class action certification, Apple and ATTM did not contest numerosity, see id., at 13-14, nor did they contest adequacy of representation, see id., at 21-22. But defendants argued that the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) had not been met, and that Rule 23(b) had not been met.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

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New Labor Law Class Action Complaints Again Top 50% Level Among Categories Of Class Action Lawsuits Filed In California State And Federal Courts

Jul 10, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

As a resource to California class action defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. This report covers the time period from July 2 – 8, 2010, during which time 46 new class actions were filed in these California state and federal courts, despite the fact courts were closed for the July 4th holiday.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

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HELOC Class Action Defense Cases–In re JP Morgan Chase: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Plaintiffs Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In Northern District Of Illinois

Jul 9, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiffs Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by Class Action Defendants, and Transfers Class Actions to Northern District of Illinois Nine class actions – two each in the Central and Northern Districts of California, and one each in the Eastern and Southern Districts of California, the Northern District of Illinois, the District of Minnesota, and the Northern District of Texas – were filed against various Chase defendants arising out of home equity lines of credit.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

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Bankruptcy Class Action Defense Cases–In re Wilborn: Fifth Circuit Court Reverses Class Action Certification Order By Bankruptcy Court Because Requirements Of Rule 23(b) Not Met

Jul 8, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Bankruptcy Court had Jurisdiction to Certify Debtor-Class Action Against Wells Fargo but Prerequisites for Class Action Certification under Rule 23(b) were not Satisfied, Particularly with Respect to Damages Fifth Circuit Holds

The three named plaintiffs in this action (Judy Wilborn, Karlton and Monica Flournoy, and Judy Martin) filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions in Texas. In re Wilborn, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. June 18, 2010) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. According to the allegations underlying the class action complaint, plaintiffs have home loans that are held or serviced by Wells Fargo Bank, and they allege that the Bank “charged, or charged and collected, unreasonable and unapproved post-petition professional fees and costs during the pendency of their bankruptcies.” _Id._, at 2. The fees and costs challenged by the class action – which “include such things as bankruptcy attorneys’ fees, recording fees, notification fees, title search fees, document fees, and property inspection fees” – are permitted under each plaintiff’s loan documents. _Id._ Nonetheless, plaintiffs’ class action complaint accused the Bank of engaging in a pattern and practice of charging such fees in violation of bankruptcy laws on the theory that “Wells Fargo’s failure to disclose these fees to the bankruptcy court interferes with their ability to complete their Chapter 13 reorganization plans and emerge from bankruptcy having cured all arrearages.” _Id._ Plaintiffs also object to the fact that these fees and costs continued to accumulate during the pendency of the bankruptcy even though Wells Fargo received distributions from the Chapter 13 Trustee in accord with the individual bankruptcy plans. _Id._ The class action complaint acknowledged that the Bank charged plaintiffs fees that it had incurred both prior to and after confirmation of the bankruptcy plans, that the fees ranged from $1200 to $4000, and that in some instances at least a portion of the fees were approved by the bankruptcy court. _Id._, at 3. Plaintiffs moved the bankruptcy court to certify their complaint as a class action; the bankruptcy court granted the motion, certifying a class that consisted of more than 1200 members. _Id._, at 3-4. The bankruptcy court certified its class action certification order for direct appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and Wells Fargo also petitioned the Circuit Court for permission to appeal the certification order. _Id._, at 4. The Fifth Circuit granted the Bank’s petition for an interlocutory appeal and reversed the class action certification order. The Court concluded that “a bankruptcy judge may certify a class of debtors under appropriate circumstances but that the proposed class in this case does not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Federal Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 7023.” _Id._, at 2.

The Fifth Circuit explained that the appeal presented two issues: “The questions at issue are whether a bankruptcy judge may certify a class action comprised of debtor-plaintiffs, and if so, whether the class certification in this case was proper.” In re Wilborn, at 1-2. Wells Fargo first challenged whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the class certification order, id., at 4. While the Circuit Court recognized that “there has been disagreement among courts as to whether a bankruptcy judge may certify a class action of debtors,” id., at 8, it had no difficulty in holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the putative class action, see id., at 4-9. The central issue on appeal, then, was whether the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23 had been met. Id., at 9.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

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Arbitration Class Action Defense Cases–Puleo v. Chase Bank: Third Circuit Court Affirms District Court Order Compelling Arbitration Of Individual Claims Based On Class Action Waiver In Arbitration Clause

Jul 7, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Unconscionability Challenge to Class Action Waiver in Cardmember Agreement Governing Credit Card was Properly Determined by District Court, not Arbitrator, so District Court did not Err in Granting Bank’s Motion in Putative Class Action to Compel Plaintiffs to Arbitrate Individual Claims Third Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Chase Bank alleging that the Bank improperly increased the interest rates on their credit card account balances, and that it did so retroactively. Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. May 10, 2010) [Slip Opn., at 1, 4]. The class action was filed in Pennsylvania state court, but removed to federal court on grounds on diversity. _Id._, at 6-7. According to the allegations underlying the class action complaint, the Bank retroactively increased the interest rate on one plaintiff’s account from 4.99% to 29.99%, and on another plaintiff’s account from 14.74% to 25.99%. _Id._, at 4. Defense attorneys argued that the terms of the Cardmember Agreements permitted the challenged interest rate increases, and that the interest rate increases did not violate state or federal laws. _Id._ However, the propriety of the increases is not relevant to the appeal. Rather, the appeal focused on the arbitration clause in the Cardmember Agreement, which prohibits class actions. _Id._, at 3. Plaintiffs filed the putative class action in state court, and Chase removed the action to federal court and moved the district court to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims on an individual basis because of the class action waiver in the Cardmember Agreement, _id._ Plaintiffs countered that the class action waiver was unconscionable, and that the question of its enforceability should be decided by the arbitrator instead of the court. _Id._ The district court disagreed, “concluding, first, that [plaintiffs’] challenge to the enforceability of the class action waiver was a question of arbitrability for the court to decide, and, second, that the entirety of the Arbitration Agreement was enforceable.” _Id._ On appeal, plaintiffs argued only that the district court erred in ruling on the issue of the unconscionability of the class action waiver, _id._ In a 6-4 decision, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court properly determined the enforceability of the class action arbitration wavier and affirmed. _Id._

The Cardmember Agreement required credit card account customers to arbitrate any disputes with Chase on an individual basis. Puleo, at 5-6 (see NOTE, below). “Despite the express ban on class actions, [plaintiffs] initially brought this case as a putative class action in Pennsylvania state court on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated Chase credit card holders in Pennsylvania.” Id., at 6 (footnote omitted). As noted above, defense attorneys removed the putative class action to federal court, and the district court granted a defense motion to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims on an individual basis, upholding the enforceability of the class action waiver. Id., at 7-8. The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that “Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) ‘to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.’” Id., at 9 (citations omitted). And with respect to the specific issue presented by the appeal, the Circuit Court noted that Supreme Court authority holds that “[t]he question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the question of arbitrability, is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.” Id., at 9-10 (citation omitted).

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

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Class Action Defense Cases–Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Securities Class Action Holding No Cause Of Action Exists For Foreign Plaintiffs Suing For Misconduct Involving Securities Traded On Foreign Exchanges

Jul 6, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

District Court Properly Dismissed Securities Class Action but Existing Circuit Court Authority Overruled because Neither § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 nor Rule 10b-5 is Extraterritorial Supreme Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against National Australia Bank, and its wholly-owned subsidiary HomeSide Lending (a mortgage servicing company) and three of its executives, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 after National announced that it was writing down the value of HomeSide causing its stock price to drop. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2010 WL 2518523, *3-*4 (2010). According to the allegations underlying the class action, from 1998 to 2001 both National’s annual reports and other public documents, and HomeSide’s executives, “touted the success of HomeSide’s business.” _Id._, at *3. But in July 2001, National wrote down the value of HomeSide by $450 million, and in September it wrote down the value of HomeSide by another $1.75 billion. _Id._ The class action alleged that National downplayed the write-downs, and that HomeSide and its executives “had manipulated HomeSide’s financial models…in order to cause the mortgage-servicing rights to appear more valuable than they really were.” _Id._ The class action complaint was filed in the district court for the Southern District of New York and “alleged violations of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934…, and SEC Rule 10b-5,” _id._, at *4. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). _Id._ The federal court dismissed the class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “because the acts in this country were, ‘at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad.’” _Id._ (citation omitted). The Second Circuit affirmed on the same grounds, _id._ (citation omitted). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed.

The Supreme Court explained that this case presented the question of “whether § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.” Morrison, at *3. As a preliminary matter, the High Court addressed Second Circuit’s analysis of the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) and circuit court precedent on the issue. Id. (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208, modified on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979)). The Court explained at page *4, “But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s “‘power to hear a case.’”’ [Citations.] It presents an issue quite separate from the question whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief. [Citation.]” But while this was error, the Supreme Court declined to remand the matter finding “that unnecessary” because “nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on the mistake, [so] a remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion.” Id., at *4-*5.

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

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HAPPY JULY 4th FROM THE CLASS ACTION DEFENSE BLOG

Jul 5, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

The author of the Class Action Defense Blog wishes all of you a very happy Independence Day. A new class action article will be published tomorrow.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

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Labor Law Class Action Filings Fall Below 50% Level But Continues As Top Category Of New Class Action Lawsuits Filed In California State And Federal Courts

Jul 3, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

To assist class action defense attorneys anticipate the types of lawsuits against which they will have to defend in California courts, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

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CAFA Class Action Defense Cases–Anderson v. Bayer: Seventh Circuit Court Holds Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Provision For “Mass Actions” Did Not Allow Federal Courts To Treat Separate Lawsuits As One Lawsuit To Meet 100 Plaintiff Threshold

Jul 1, 2010 | By: Michael J. Hassen

“Mass Action” Provision in Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Extending Federal Court Jurisdiction to Lawsuits Involving at Least 100 Plaintiffs, did not Permit Federal Courts to Treat Multiple, “Virtually Identical Complaints” by Same Plaintiffs’ Counsel as a Single Lawsuit for Purposes of Determining Number of Plaintiffs Seventh Circuit Holds

Five separate but “mostly identical complaints” (not class actions) were filed against various Bayer entities in Illinois state court seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by Bayer’s prescription drug Trasylol. Anderson v. Bayer Corp., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. June 22, 2010) [Slip Opn., at 1, 3]. According to the “virtually identical” lawsuits, “plaintiffs (or their decedents) suffered injuries as a result of being administered Trasylol during heart surgery.” _Id._, at 3-4. Defense attorneys removed the lawsuits to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), asserting that the lawsuits fell within CAFA’s “mass action” provision “which allows the removal of cases joining the claims of at least 100 plaintiffs that otherwise meet CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements.” _Id._, at 3. The district court remanded four of the five lawsuits on the ground that they involved less than 100 – it was, apparently, only by accident that the fifth lawsuit named precisely 100 plaintiffs. _Id._ Bayer asked the Seventh Circuit for permission to appeal the remand order; defense attorneys argued that the Circuit Court should “hold that (1) plaintiffs cannot avoid federal diversity jurisdiction by carving their filings into five separate pleadings, and (2) there is diversity jurisdiction over most plaintiff’s claims because the claims of the small number of non-diverse plaintiffs were fraudulently misjoined and should be severed.” _Id._ The Circuit Court rejected the appeal because it agreed with the district court that the lawsuits fell outside the scope of CAFA’s “mass action” provision because they involved fewer than 100 plaintiffs; accordingly, the Court held that it was without jurisdiction to reach the second issue advanced by Bayer. _Id._

Plaintiffs’ counsel originally filed “four virtually identical complaints, using verbatim language,” in Illinois state court “on behalf of 57 unrelated plaintiffs.” Anderson, at 3-4. Defense attorneys removed the lawsuits to federal court on grounds of diversity, arguing that the non-diverse plaintiffs had been joined fraudulently to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Id., at 4. The federal court remanded the complaint to state court sua sponte. Id. On remand, plaintiffs’ counsel amended the lawsuits to add another 111 plaintiffs, distributed across the four complaints and bringing the total number of plaintiffs in one of those lawsuits to 100; plaintiffs’ counsel also filed a fifth lawsuit. Id. Bayer again removed the lawsuits to federal court on the ground that the five separate complaints “should be treated as a single mass action,” id. The lawsuits were again remanded to state court and Bayer filed a petition seeking permission to appeal under the CAFA provision that “creates an exception for class actions to the general rule that remand orders are not reviewable.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)).

Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized

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