Mervyn’s Class Action Defense Case-Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s: California Supreme Court Holds Proposition 64 Applies “Retroactively” To Section 17200 Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Claims

California Supreme Court’s Decision Adds “Standing” to Class Action Defense Arsenal Against UCL Claims Pending at Time of Proposition 64’s Passage

California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), California Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200 et seq., was enacted “to protect consumers and competitors” alike from unfair competition in commercial markets for goods and services “by promoting fair competition,” Kasky v. Nike, 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 (Cal. 2002). While government entities may enforce the provisions of the UCL, California law also permits private parties to enforce its terms. Generally, however, the UCL was not intended to provide a means of redressing a personal injury; rather, California’s statutory scheme permits a party on behalf of the public (other consumers or competitors) to enjoin an unlawful or unfair business practice. These so-called “representative actions” are often filed as class actions. The California Supreme Court today resolved the issue of whether Proposition 64, approved in November 2004, applies to cases pending at the time of its passage. Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, ___ Cal.4th ___ (Cal. July 24, 2006).

The scope of the UCL is extremely broad. It defines “unfair competition” to “include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” The Supreme Court has referred to this as “sweeping language” and declared that it is intended to cover “‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.'” Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266 (Cal. 1992) (citation omitted). As the court explained, “[i]n essence, an action based on Business and Professions Code section 17200 to redress an unlawful business practice ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats these violations, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 377, 383 (Cal. 1992) (citation omitted).

Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

15 U.S.C. § 1681a – Definitions; rules of construction: Statutory Language of the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) for the Class Action Defense Lawyer

As a resource for the defense lawyer defending against class actions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA on this site for attorneys.

§ 1681a. Definitions; rules of construction

(a) Definitions and rules of construction set forth in this section are applicable for the purposes of this title.

(b) The term “person” means any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.

(c) The term “consumer” means an individual.

(d) Consumer Report

(1) In general.

The term “consumer report” means any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to e used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’ s eligibility for

(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;

(B) employment purposes; or

(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.

(2) Exclusions.

Except as provided in paragraph (3), the term “consumer report” does not include

(A) subject to section 1681s-3 of this title, any

(i) report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report;

(ii) communication of that information among persons related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control; or

(iii) communication of other information among persons related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may be communicated among such persons and the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that the information is initially communicated, to direct that such information not be communicated among such persons;

(B) any authorization or approval of a specific extension of credit directly or indirectly by the issuer of a credit card or similar device;

(C) any report in which a person who has been requested by a third party to make a specific extension of credit directly or indirectly to a consumer conveys his or her decision with respect to such request, if the third party advises the consumer of the name and address of the person to whom the request was made, and such person makes the disclosures to the consumer required under section § 1681m of this title; or

(D) a communication described in subsection (o) or (x).

(3) Restriction on sharing of medical information.

Except for information or any communication of information disclosed as provided in section 1681b(g)(3), the exclusions in paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to information disclosed to any person related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the information is–

(A) medical information;

(B) an individualized list or description based on the payment transactions of the consumer for medical products or services; or

(C) an aggregate list of identified consumers based on payment transactions for medical products or services.

FCRA Class Actions Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

General Overview Of The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA): Class Action Defense Issues

In 1970, Congress enacted the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.) to “require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information,” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Congress did so based on its recognition that, “There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’ s right to privacy.” § 1681(a)(4). And to ensure that its goals were met, Congress enacted a section of the FCRA that specifically prohibits consumer reporting agencies from avoiding the effects of the law through “corporate” or “technological circumvention,” see §1681x. Courts have referred to the FCRA’s statutory scheme as both “comprehensive,” FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and “complex,” Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003). We provide but a brief overview here.

A “consumer reporting agency” is defined as “any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).

FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

15 U.S.C. § 1681 – Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose for the Fair Credit Reporting Act: Statutory Language for the Defense Lawyer of Class Action Lawsuits Under the FCRA

As a service to class action defense attorneys, we provide here the text of the relevant statutory provisions of the FCRA. We have endeavored to make this accurate as of January 1, 2006. It includes those amendments to the FCRA contained in the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACT), Public Law 108-159, as well as those in Section 506 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Public Law 106-102. In 1970, Congress enacted the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.

FCRA Class Actions Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

Federal Court Order Compelling Arbitration And Granting Class Action Defense Motion To Dismiss TILA Case Is Appealable Under FAA And Plaintiff Did Not Meet Burden Of Establishing Prohibitive Cost of Arbitration-Class Action Defense Cases

Green Tree v. Randolph: U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Order Compelling Arbitration Pursuant to Lender’s Arbitration Provision under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) Because Plaintiff Did Not Establish that Arbitral Forum would be Prohibitively Expensive: Truth in Lending Act (TILA) Class Action Claims Properly Dismissed

In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), the United States Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1) whether a court order granting a defense motion to compel arbitration and dismissing (rather than staying) the plaintiff’s claims is immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) as a “final decision with respect to an arbitration”; and (2) whether an arbitration provision that is silent on the question of allocation and amount of arbitration fees and costs is unenforceable for failure to “affirmatively protect a party from potentially steep arbitration costs.” Id., at 82. The putative class action against Green Tree alleged violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., and arose from a loan to the putative class action representative for the purchase of a mobile home evidenced by a Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement that expressly provided for all disputes to be resolved by finding arbitration under the provisions of the FAA. Id., at 82-83 and n.1. Plaintiff asserted that Green Tree violated TILA by failing to disclose a specific insurance requirement as a finance charge; she later added a claim under the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. based on the requirement that she arbitrate her statutory claims for relief. The district court granted the class action defense team’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request to certify the case as a class action. Id., at 83.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Plaintiff Firm Indicted In California Becomes Target Of Lawsuits

Indiana Court Requires Class Action Firm Milberg Weiss and Its Class Representatives to Produce Financial Records Dating Back to 1998 David Cay Johnston of the New York Times reports today that an Indiana court has granted a motion by American United Life Insurance Class to compel class action plaintiff firm Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP and four of the firm’s clients to produce financial records dating back to 1998. Federal prosecutors filed criminal charges in California against Milberg Weiss and two of its partners in mid-May 2006 alleging that the firm paid millions of dollars in kickbacks to clients to serve as plaintiffs; charges the firm and its partners deny.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Correy Stephenson’s Article Proves True For California – Class Action Defense Attorneys Again Face More Employment Law Class Action Cases Than Any Other Category

In an article published on July 17, 2006, Correy Stephenson – a staff writer for Lawyers USA – reports on the increase in employment law class actions, particularly under the federal FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act). Her article and findings are certainly consistent with the court filings seen in California state and federal courts. To aid California class action defense attorneys in anticipating claims against which they may have to defend, we recently began to provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for class actions filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Hepting v. AT&T Corp.: California Federal Court Rejects Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Challenging Warrantless Surveillance Program

San Francisco Federal Court Denies Motion by Class Action Defense and Federal Government to Dismiss Lawsuit on Grounds of “State Secrets” Privilege and Immunity, But Certifies Order for Interlocutory Appeal

After the federal government’s warrantless surveillance program was revealed in the press, and after AT&T and President Bush admitted the existence of the program, a putative class action was filed in San Francisco federal court against AT&T alleging that its participation in the program violated numerous constitutional and federal laws, as well as California’s unfair competition law (UCL), California Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200 et seq. AT&T moved to dismiss the class action complaint on grounds of standing, failure to plead that AT&T did not have a government certification, and immunity; the federal government intervened and moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on the state secrets privilege. Yesterday, the California district court denied the defense motions, but certified its order for immediate appeal. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006). The court’s order is exceptionally detailed; we provide but a brief summary of it below. The entire opinion may be downloaded from the link at the end of this article.

The district court first addressed the federal government’s “state secrets” defense. “‘The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule that protects information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to the national security.'” Slip Opn., at 5 (citation omitted). Importantly, an inquiry into the state secrets privilege does not turn on “a balancing of ultimate interests at stake in the litigation,” Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Rather, the question is whether the harm that may result from the disclosure at issue requires that the information be withheld as a matter of “absolute right,” id. The district court in Hepting applied the standard set forth in the Ninth Circuit’s “definitive opinion on the state secrets privilege,” Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998). Slip Opn., at 12. The federal government asserted that Kasza required dismissal because “(1) the very subject matter of this case is a state secret, (2) plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie case for their claims without classified evidence and (3) the privilege effectively deprives AT&T of information necessary to raise valid defenses.” Slip Opn., at 15 . The court rejected each of these arguments.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Newell v. State Farm: California Court Denies Class Certification In Homeowners’ Putative UCL (Unfair Competition Law) Class Action Against Insurer

Class Action Defense Attorneys Prevail on Demurrer Challenging Class Action Allegations – California Court Holds Plaintiffs’ Lawyer Could not Establish “Community of Interest” (Commonality) California homeowners filed a putative class action against their homeowners’ insurance carriers, Farmers Insurance Exchange and Mid-Century Insurance Exchange (collectively “Farmers”) and State Farm General Insurance, asserting claims for declaratory relief, breach of contract, bad faith, and unfair competition (UCL) based on the allegation that they “were wrongfully denied policy benefits for damage caused to their homes by the Northridge earthquake.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Overton v. Walt Disney Company: Disney’s Class Action Defense Prevails – Disney Not Required To Compensate Employees For Time Spent Riding Shuttle From Parking Lot To Theme Park California Court Holds

California Court Holds that Disney did not Require Employees to Drive to Work and to Take Shuttle from Parking Lot to Work, So Disney was not Required to Compensate Them for Travel Time Spent Riding Shuttle

A Disney employee filed a putative class action against the company seeking compensation under California state law for travel time based on the theory that certain employees were assigned to a parking lot located one mile from the Disneyland theme park, and Disney provided shuttles to transport them between the parking lot and the park. Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal.App.4thh 263 (Cal.App. 2006). The class action defense attorneys argued that the California Supreme Court opinion in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575 (Cal. 2000) – which held that if an employer requires employees to travel in a company vehicle to work then it must compensate the employees for their travel time – did not apply. The defense moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the undisputed evidence established that Disney did not require employees to drive to work (and, in fact, encouraged and offered financial incentives to employees who used alternative means of transportation), and that Disney did not require employees to use the shuttle to travel from the parking lot to the theme park (some employees, for example, would walk or ride a bike). Overton, at 267-68. The trial court granted the defense motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s lawyer appealed.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized